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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISCONNECTION OF PART OF THE
TERRITORY OF WEST JORDAN,
INC.

No. 9254

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

In reply to Respondent's Brief filed on appeal, we
wish to redirect the Court's attention to the question
before the Courts namely, whether the area seeking disconnection comes within the provisions of Sections 104-1, 2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as being land "within
and lying upon the borders" of the incorporated town.
We particularly point this out because much of
the substance of respondent's brief (particularly pages
7-9) resorts to what respondent terms "inferences"
to
be assumed from the findings, conclusions of law and
judgment in it favor. These so-called inferences are not

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

2

justified and seem to be calculated to avoid the jurisdictional question before this Court.
It might be helpful to here set forth the pertinent
portions of Sections 10-4-1 and 10-4-2:
"10-4-1. * * * Whenever a majority of the real
property owners in territory within and lying upon the borders of any incorporated city or town
shall file with the clerk of the district court of
the county in which such territory lies a petition
praying that such territory be disconnected therefrom, and such petition sets forth reasons why
such territory should be disconnected from such
city or town, and is accompanied with a map or
plat of the territory sought to be disconnected
* * * Issue shall be joined and the case tried as
provided for the trial of civil causes as nearly
as may be.

/s%Z

"10-4-2. * * * If the court finds that the petition was signed by a majority of the reaj^jprop^i^XJXWTiPirs^Ohe^territory concerned and that
the allegations of the petition are true and that
justice and equity require that such territory or
any part thereof should be disconnected from
such city or town, it shall appoint three disinterested persons as commissioners to adjust the
term upon which such part shall be so severed
as to any liabilities of such city or town that
have accrued during the connection of such part
with the corporation, and as to the mutual property rights of the city or town and the territory
to be detached."

In the trial court, the case was fully tried on its
merits, and after consideration of all the evidence, the
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trial court found all of the issues in favor of petitioners,
appellants herein, and on the grounds alleged in the
petition entered its findings of fact and conclusions of
law under date of January 5, 1960 (R. 9-11). Pending
the appointment of commissioners to adjust mutual
property rights, respondent (the town) filed its motion
(R. 12) on January 12, 1960, to set aside the findings
and conclusions or in the alternative grant a new trial.
The Court did not grant a new trial, nor vacate or
set aside the findings of fact entered January 5, 1960,
(R. 9-11), but made additional findings (R. 14-17) bearing solely on the question of wrhether the area seeking
disconnection was "within and lying upon the borders of
the town." This was the sole question concerning which
further argument and briefs were requested and passed
upon. Bearing upon this question, the Court on March
17, 1960, made a further finding (R. 14) as to the approximate shape of the area seeking disconnection, and
that such area did not "come within the requirements
of Section 10-4-1, U.C.A. 1953" of being within and
upon the borders of the town. The sole conclusion of law
then made by the Court was as follows:
"1. The area seeking disconnection does not
come within the statute of being 'within and lying
upon the borders' of the towTn of West Jordan
and therefore, notwithstanding prior findings of
the Court, the petition for disconnection must be
denied." (R. 15)
It seems abundantly clear from reading the preface
to the Findings of Fact prepared by respondent's coun-
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sel wherein it states that "Notwithstanding the prior
findings of his Court," (R. 14) that Judge Anderson
did not intend thereby to vacate or set aside his prior
Findings of Fact and in effect modified or amended such
findings only in the one respect, namely, that the area
seeking disconnection did not meet the requirements
of the statute as lying "within and upon the borders of
the town."
This modification or amendment of the findings and
judgment falls within the purpose of Rule 52(b), which
authorizes the trial court to amend the findings and
judgment upon timely motion made.
However, whatever doubt there may have been in
regard to this question is conclusively laid to rest by
reason of the Order dated March 21, 1960 (R. 17). This
order was entered at the suggestion of the court at the
time counsel for both sides was advised as to the ruling
of the court on the jurisdictional question raised by
respondent in order that this court would be adequately
advised as to the basis of his decision on the merits
since the reasons set forth there was not included in the
Findings of Fact entered January 5, 1960. This order
specifically reads:
"2. Except for the dismissal of the petition
in this cause by reason of this court not having
jurisdiction due to the location of the area seeking disconnection with respect to the border of
the town, the following additional findings of
fact would have been made and entered and this
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is not done at this time because the same are not
necessary in view of the action of this court:
"(1)

The Utah-Idaho Sugar Company and
other petitioners were not given adequate notice prior to the bond election
authorizing the issuance of the sewer
bonds to adequately protect their
property a n d interest against the
bonding of the town through general
obligation bonds and disseminated information prior to the election with
respect to the financing of said bonds
which was not correct.

"(2)

A representative of the Town of West
Jordan prevented the erroneous information referred to above from being
corrected at the only mass meeting
held prior to the bond election.

"Dated this 21st day of March, 1960.
By the Court:
/ s / Aldon J. Anderson
JUDGE"
Most of the authorities cited by respondent in its
brief are cases in which the lower court was upheld in
affirming that the petition should not be granted because
the injurious effect of such disconnection outweighed
the cause for granting it, whereas the lower court here
found that no substantial harm would result to the area
not seeking disconnection by the granting of this petition (K. 10—Finding No. 6). Eespondent would disregard this important distinction by its statement on page
2 of its brief, last paragraph, "This question is much
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the same whether considered as jurisdictional, or, as a
fact to be determined under all the circumstances and
under all the evidence to be presented in the case." Respondent then proceeds to contend that this court should
infer that the lower court actually found contrary to
Finding of Fact No. 6 entered January 5, 1960 (E. 10)
since the lower court refused to grant its Motion to
Dismiss (R. 6) before trial.
In Application of Peterson, 92 Utah 212, 66 P. (2)
1195, the court severed a portion of the area seeking
disconnection and specifically made comment of the fact
that symmetry was a matter of "justice and equity"
and the particular shape of the area was not the sole
consideration. The court also made comment of the fact
that loss of income derived from taxation of such land
was an insufficient ground or reason for refusing segregation. Certainly that case does not stand for the
proposition that the trial court does not have jurisdiction to consider the merits of any application for
disconnection by reason of the fact that an area projects
into the remainder of the town. It is, of course, important for the court to determine what effect this projection
has upon the proper functioning of the area remaining
in the town and this aspect of the case at bar was thoroughly investigated in this extended trial and the lower
court resolved that issue against the respondent and
refused to alter its position in this regard after concluding that it had been in error as to the jurisdictional
aspect of this petition.
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As to the Anaconda case, it is surprising that counsel for respondent would urge this court to follow the
decision in that case despite many reasonable grounds
for distinction pointed out in appellants' brief without
even discussing those distinctions. If cases having similar facts but not substantially the same on all facts were
urged as precedents, the courts would have an even
more difficult task than they do in determining what
the law is.
It is obvious that any disconnection of part of a
town's terrritory is injurious to it, if only from the
revenue aspect, which is the motivating reason for resisting practically all such applications. In many, if not
most, of the petitions for disconnection, the area seeking
disconnection projects to a greater or lesser extent
into the town area and, to that extent, one would presume that there is some injurious effect aside from the
loss of revenue. However, the actual extent of this injury
cannot be determined merely by looking at the shape
of the area seeking disconnection and its relationship
to the remaining portions of the town because the entire
city area of some cities and towns is very complex
because of its residential and industrial area whereas
other towns, such as West Jordan, have large portions
of rural and agricultural lands included where they were
originally incorporated for such purposes as having a
cemetery, as was West Jordan, or for some other purpose where the boundaries have little relation to the
town's functions except to the extent of the area included
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for revenue purposes. The fundamental question, therefore, for this court to determine is whether or not the
trial court has jurisdiction to consider an application
for disconnection, and thus determine the actual extent
of the claimed injury, or whether injury too severe to
tolerate must conclusively be presumed to exist in accordance with the supposed intent of the legislature when
most of the area seeking disconnection does not have its
boundary contiguous to the boundaries of town. Town
boundaries, of course, are of such widely varying shapes
that both the town here and North Salt Lake had islands
within them prior to the disconnection proceedings in
this case and in the case of Hotvard v. Town of North
Salt Lake, 7 U. (2) 278, 323 P. (2) 261. It hardly seems
likely that the legislature would declare that the injury
ipso facto to a town would be so much greater because
the shorter side of the rectangle (or an irregular area
as here) was the portion contiguous to the borders of the
town than if the longer side of such an area were contiguous that the court could properly consider the actual
injury suffered by the town in the latter case but not
the former.
In the case of Greenwood Village v. Heckendorf, 126
Colo. 180, 247 P. (2) 678, cited by on page six of respondent's as following the Anaconda case, the question was
not whether a sufficient portion of the area seeking
disconnection was on the border but rather as there
stated by the Court (P. 681):
"Did the trial court err in striking the seventh defense contained in the answer, which alleged that the disconnection sought would divide
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the town into two areas Avholly separated from
each other ?"
In answer the Court then said:
"This question must be answered in the affirmative. The disconnection of land from a town
cannot be permitted where the result thereof
would be to divide the municipality into two areas
wholly isolated from each other." (Emphasis
added)
In Mogaard v. City of Garrison, 47 N.D. 468, 182
N.W. 758, cited page six of respondent's brief, the basis
of the decision appears to have been primarily that
mandamus was not the proper remedy, and petitioners
did not meet the mandatory conditions of the statute
requiring a showing that no municipal sewers, water
mains, etc. had been made of constructed in the area,
In Lincoln Addition Improvement Company v. Lenhart, 50 N.D. 25, 195 N.W. 14, also cited page six of
respondent's brief, a right of way of the Northern Pacific Railway extended along the east edge of the town
between the town border and the area seeking disconnection. The opinion is not clear as to how much, if
any, of the railroad right of way was within the area
seeking disconnection, but the court did comment that,
considering the railroad right of way, the area was not
contiguous for jurisdictional and transportation purposes. No similar situation exists in the instant case.
In Swanson v. the City of Fairfield, 155 Neb. 682, 53
N.W.(2) 90, the effect would be to "leave a boot of
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urban land projecting into rural land." (This boot consisted of a residential area three blocks wide and seven
blocks long.) Certainly no city blocks or residential area
will project into the farming land because of the disconnection in this case, and, conversely, no boot of farming land is projected into urban land here either.
Regarding the authorities cited, respondent has not
seen fit to comment on the case of Town of Gypsum v.
Lundgren, 61 Colo. 332, 157 P. 195. In that case, the
statute provided:
"That whenever a tract or contiguous tracts
of land aggregating twenty (20) or more acres
in area are embraced within the corporate limits
* * *, the owner or owners * * * may petition * * *
to have the same disconnected."
Three land owners petitioned for disconnection. Only
one of these three tracts (fourteen and a fraction acres)
owned by Lundgren bordered on the exterior limits of
the town. The other tracts did not, but were contiguous
to the Lundgren tract. In granting disconnection, the
court said:
"The words ' tract or tracts' apply to the
pieces making the aggregate of 20 acres or more
in the city or town. The words following 'and
being upon or contiguous to the border thereof
apply to the 20 acres or more as a unit for consideration under the petition. The context thus
indicates. This position is strengthened when we
consider section 2, whcih provides that:
" ' Such petition shall show to the court that
such tract or tracts of land contain in the aggre-
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gate an area of twenty or more acres, upon or
adjacent to the border of said city or town.'
"We thus find in this section a recognition
of the 20 acres or more as a unit which is required to be upon or adjacent to the border of
the town. To hold otherwise would be to say that
this land could be disconnected if owned by one
person but that it could not, if owned by three.
This might be a discrimination without a reason
for it."
We believe this decision is particularly pertinent
as illustrating that the statute should be given a practical interpretation, that all land owners contiguous to
and having a community and continuity of interest with
lands lying upon the border should not be denied the
right to join in a petition for severance. In the instant
case, the trial court recognized and found that all of
the area seeking disconnection had a community or continuity of interests and found:
"4. The portion of the town seeking disconnection # * * consists essentially of farms,
dairies, and a sugar factory and is agricultural
and rural in nature, whereas the remaining portion, that is the portion of said town not seeking
disconnection, includes within its confines the
business and residential area.
"5. Part of the sewer system is now installed and that portion was planned and designed to serve that portion of the town not
seeking disconnection and does not presently
serve the area seeking disconnection, and petitioners do not presently receive any benefit commensurate with the obligation to which they would
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be subjected by reason of said bonded indebtedness and would not even if the sewer system were
extended to include their area.
"6. The portion of the town seeking disconnection is not necessary to the incorporated
area for the purpose of continuing its general
town purposes and such disconnection will not
result in any substantial harm to the area not
seeking disconnection.
"7. That justice and equity require that the
property sought to be disconnected and which is
hereafter described be disconnected from the incorporated Town of West Jordan." (R. 9-10)
If the trial court had jurisdiction to disconnect the
particular lands lying approximately one-half mile on
the southern border, ivliich most certainly it did, then
the court, having jurisdiction, we submit, had jurisdiction to disconnect the adjoining lands similarly affected.
The legislative intent should in justice be given this
practical application. I t would not be practical, nor just,
to require that each contiguous land owner should be
required to file separate petitions or to say that the
court had jurisdiction to disconnect the property owners
whose lands bordered the Southern boundary of the town
and then leave each adjacent property owner then lying
on the borders to separately petition to accomplish the
same end result. Under its powers of "equity and justice''
Avhich favored disconnection of the entire unit, the court
having jurisdiction should not be so restricted when
such result would be to deny "equity and justice."
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Usually the same requirements for annexation or
extension of corporate limits are required as are required for disconnection. In Utah this is permitted under
Section 10-3-1, Utah Code Annotated 1953, by two-thirds
vote of the town board, without a court hearing, as to
lands lying "contiguous" to the town limits. Certainly
the Town of West Jordan, or other municipalities, have
never accepted the intrepretation of Section 10-3-1 as
limiting them to just the immediate property owners
adjacent to the town. If so, they would have to proceed
by successive proceedings to annex each adjacent property owner to validate such annexation. "Contiguous
territory is treated similarly to lying on the borders or
boundary in Village of Niobrara, 158 Neb. 517, 63 N.W.
(2) 867. The power of the village to annex territory
was limited to annexing "contiguous territory." In that
case the court denied annexation because the record
failed to show that any part of the territory sought to
be annexed to the village was contiguous to it, or that
"any part of the boundary of the area is coexistent with
a part of the boundary of the village."
In the instant case, the area seeking disconnection
is surrounded by the remaining portion of the Town
of West Jordan on the east, north and west, as illustrated by the map following page two of respondent's
brief. Particularly when the trial court found that justice
and equity on all issues favored disconnection, it cannot be said that such disconnection would gut or divide

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

14
the town as contended by respondents. The findings of
the Court are to the contrary.
Counsel for respondent concede that the lower
court would have had jurisdiction to have entered the
decree of severance if the legislature had used the word
"standing" instead of the word " lying." It is respectfully submitted, however, that land does not stand or
lie but is situated with reference to and that both connotations import that the land standing or lying touches
the reference referred to in the statute.
As a matter of statutory construction that construction is to be preferred wThich permits the cause to
be determined on its merits and which avoids a multiplicity of suits. The application of either of these two
principles to the statute in question would resolve this
case in appellants' favor. Otherwise the appellant petitioners whose property is closest to the southern
boundary of West Jordan may petition for disconnection
despite this prior dismissal, which was not on the merits.
If granted the relief Judge Anderson determined they
were entitled to on the merits, then those adjacent to
the new southern boundary may do likewise with the
effect pointed out in appellant's first brief (and which
was not discussed in respondent's brief). One of the
justifiable criticisms of the law and legal procedures is
that the results many times are not reasonably related to
what is right or fair. Such a result is to be avoided
unless the statute in question cannot reasonably be con-
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strued otherwise. It is respectfully submitted that this
statute cannot only be reasonably construed otherwise but
that it is more reasonable to construe in such other
fashion.
In the instant case, if the petitioners are not allowed
to disconnect themselves from the Town of West Jordan
the effect will be to require them to pay a large portion
of the taxes and bonded indebtedness without any or
equal benefits. Such result is not to serve equity and
justice, but to defeat the same, and of necessity to force
farmers and industry out of the community.
We repectfully submit that the trial court was in
error in finding it lacked jurisdiction, and that the judgment should be reversed and the trial court directed to
grant a decree of severance.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT B. HANSEN
Attorney for Petitioners
65 East 4th South
Salt Lake City, Utah
EDWIN B. CANNON
Attorney for Petitioners
515 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

• • y •

'**> rfftlbu

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

